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t
The current post-Gault stage commenced at the beginning of 
the twenty-first century and, as of 2018, represents an ongoing 
and as yet incomplete evolution to a more remedial approach. 
Reversing the “get tough” generation, legislatures and courts 
have been “raising the age,” thereby replacing adult prosecution 
and criminal incarceration with child-oriented procedures. 
Several states have also restricted or eliminated “direct file” 
or transfer to the adult system, substituting exclusive juvenile 
court jurisdiction. The reasons for the sharp U-turn are multiple. 
Perhaps the primary cause has been the proliferation of 
neurological studies proving that the human brain’s judgmental 
and impulse controlling mechanisms do not mature until we 
attain the relatively old age (for juvenile justice purposes) of 
early to mid-20s. A dramatically falling juvenile crime rate 
has further contributed to the momentum. Last, the series of 
United States Supreme Court cases, citing the neurological 
evidence, starting with Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), 
has highlighted the fact that children and young adults are 
different and thus should qualify for less stringent sanctions.
This article will summarize the major twenty-first century 
state legislative and case law developments. It will also briefly 
note the expansion of state and local initiatives limiting the 
prosecution of youthful offenders, such as diversion and 
restorative justice programs.
RAISE THE AGE
Throughout most of the twentieth century, the 50 American 
states maintained, without change, different age limitations 
governing general juvenile delinquency jurisdiction. At the 
end of the century, the cutoff  age in three states was 16, 11 
additional states limited jurisdiction to children below the 
age of  17, and 36 states plus the District of  Columbia and 
the federal Code (governing crimes that can be prosecuted 
federally) had an established “ceiling” of age 18.





he year 2017 marked the golden anniversary of the 
landmark In re Gault decision. (387 U.S. 1 (1967).) In 
Gault, the US Supreme Court held that basic due process 
rights must be afforded to children accused of committing 
a “delinquent” act, the artful synonym of the word “crime” coined 
by the juvenile justice movement founders. Literally overnight, 
the right to counsel, effective notice, criminal law evidentiary 
standards, and the right to appellate review were incorporated into 
the historically informal, confidential, and largely unreviewable 
juvenile justice courts.
The 50-year post-Gault era may be characterized by 
three sequential chronological stages. The first, spanning 
approximately 20 years, witnessed the gradual incorporation 
of due process standards into an often recalcitrant juvenile 
justice system. The juvenile justice judiciary also wrestled 
with the difficult challenge of marrying basic Gault standards 
with the underlying philosophy of a highly discretionary, 
remedial, and individualized approach.
The second generational stage witnessed a virtually 
unrelenting attack on the perceived softness and 
ineffectiveness of the juvenile justice system. Corresponding 
with a “get tough” approach to adult criminal activity, juvenile 
court jurisdiction was compromised by adding “direct filing” 
or the automatic transfer of serious felony cases involving 
adolescents and even preadolescents to the adult criminal 
system. Most states also imposed restrictions on the former 
relatively discretionary and lenient juvenile court dispositional 
alternatives. Although the maximum age of delinquency 
jurisdiction was not formally altered, the result severely 
compromised the treatment of children who had committed 
any offense, from trespass to homicide.
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In 2007, Connecticut initiated the movement to “raise the age” 
by enacting legislation granting the juvenile courts jurisdiction 
to age 18, a two-year expansion. In less than one decade, every 
“16-year-old” state has followed the Connecticut initiative. 
(New York recently raised the age by enacting a complex 
act, which is effective in 2018 and 2019.) Simultaneously, 
the number of states maintaining an age 17 ceiling has 
been reduced from 11 to five. In the near future, 45 of the 
50 states will have adopted the national norm of age 18. 
Interestingly, raise the age legislation is pending in each of 
the five remaining “outliers.” We are close to achieving a 
universal age.
The proliferation of raise the age states has cut across 
geographic and political lines. The diversity includes Illinois, 
Massachusetts, Mississippi, and Louisiana. In several states, 
including Illinois, Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Vermont, 
bills have also been introduced to further raise the age to 20 
or 21, at least for misdemeanor cases. No state has yet gone 
beyond age 18, but at least a few may break the age 18 barrier 
in the near future. (Meanwhile, San Francisco has established 
a “Young Adult Court” in the criminal system, where youths 
between the ages of 18 and 21 may be granted ameliorative 
dispositions in lieu of incarceration. (Tim Requarth, A 
California Court for Young Adults Calls on Science, n.y. 
times, Apr. 17, 2017, https://tinyurl.com/ybyoo82h.)
Oddly, very little consideration or advocacy has addressed 
the issue of minimum age. Most states have no minimum 
threshold, permitting the prosecution of 10- or 11-year-
old children (in 2014, 36,854 children who were below the 
age of 12 were petitioned as juvenile delinquents), and at 
least theoretically sanctioning the prosecution of toddlers. 
(In New York, the governor’s commission on raise the age 
recommended raising the minimum age from seven to 12, but 
that recommendation was not approved by the legislature.)
DIRECT FILE AND TRANSFER
Juvenile court jurisdiction has never been absolute. The 
early courts in most states could “transfer,” after hearing, a 
case involving an older youth who had committed a specific 
violent felony to the adult criminal court for adjudication 
and sentencing. Until the late 1980s, transfer was a relatively 
rare event. However, toward the end of  the twentieth century, 
state legislatures greatly expanded the number of  “transfer 
eligible” cases. A majority of  states also enacted “direct file” 
statutes, removing juvenile court jurisdiction entirely for a 
large subset of  felony cases. Still others granted prosecutors 
the discretionary authority to file charges involving children 
in the adult criminal courts.
However, in the past few years direct or automatic filing has 
been reversed, frequently on a wholesale basis. For example, 
in 2016, Illinois eliminated the direct or automatic transfer 
of all children below the age of 16, regardless of the crime 
charged, limiting the practice to juveniles ages 16 or 17 who are 
charged with first-degree murder, aggravated criminal sexual 
assault, or aggravated battery with a firearm. The same year, 
California voters approved a proposition that repealed direct 
filing completely, regardless of the youth’s age or the crime 
charged. Other states that have eliminated or severely restricted 
direct filing include Vermont, New Jersey, and Indiana.Recent 
legislation will accordingly significantly diminish, though not 
abolish, the criminal prosecution of adolescents.
CONFIDENTIALITY, SEALING, AND EXPUNGEMENT
Juvenile court records are generally confidential, with only 
limited access by nonparties. A delinquency finding may 
nevertheless harm the child, perhaps years or decades after 
the fact. Collateral consequences may include employment 
restrictions, public housing eligibility, or predicate criminal 
sentencing. A youthful indiscretion may carry deleterious 
ramifications well into adulthood.
For this reason, many states provide for the sealing or 
expungement of records. The relevant statutes and court 
rules, enacted over several decades, vary significantly, but 
provide a partial albeit incomplete level of protection. In 
2015, the American Bar Association (ABA) adopted a far-
reaching resolution recommending the expungement of most 
juvenile records: the Model Act Governing the Confidentiality 
and Expungement of Juvenile Delinquency Records. The 
resolution has generated proposals, bills, and in a few sates 
laws broadening the protection umbrella. In California, for 
example, juvenile “found” delinquency records are now 
sealed and the charges are dismissed when the youth has 
satisfactorily completed a period of probation supervision or 
a diversion program, and meets other specified criteria. (Cal. 
Stats. of 2016, ch. 858 (amending Cal. welF. & inst. CoDe 
§§ 786, 827, 827.9, 828) (sealed records are nevertheless 
available for very limited purposes).) Other states have 
restricted or prohibited the solicitation of juvenile court 
history by employers. The trend to seal or expunge has barely 
commenced, but will likely expand. Further, the move to limit 
or eliminate the adult prosecution of children by raising the 
age and limiting direct file will, in itself, minimize collateral 
harm (juvenile courts records are almost always afforded 
greater confidentiality than criminal records).
SOLITARY CONFINEMENT AND ADULT PRISONS
The solitary confinement of  children who have been placed 
in juvenile or adult facilities represents an egregious threat 
to their well-being. Isolating an adolescent in a small cell or 
locked room for weeks or months should be unthinkable, 
though it has been a common practice in many jurisdictions. 
Contemporary neurological and psychological studies 
have, in fact, proven the obvious: Solitary confinement 
beyond a very brief  period causes serious psychological 
harm. The ABA has adopted a resolution prohibiting 
the solitary confinement of  persons under the age of  18 
“for any reason other than as a temporary response to 
behavior that threatens immediate harm to the youth or 
others and ends when the threat is over and, in no case, 
more than 4 hours.” In furtherance of the ABA policy, several 
states and localities have prohibited or severely limited the 
solitary confinement of juveniles. In other states, litigation 
has succeeded in prohibiting or restricting the practice. Again, 
the trend is clear.
The practice of confining children in adult jail or prisons, 
a consequence of direct file or transfer, has also been limited. 
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For example, New Jersey has prohibited the incarceration of 
any person under the age of 18 in adult facilities. The New 
York “raise the age” legislation will prohibit the incarceration 
of any person under the age of 18 in Rikers Island, the 
notoriously abusive New York City jail. The movement to 
bar the incarceration of children in any adult facility has 
gained considerable support.
OTHER DEVELOPMENTS
One reform that has virtually overnight been implemented 
in several jurisdictions is the prohibition or restriction 
of  shackling children in court. The sordid practice, 
addressed in a recent ABA resolution, appears to be 
destined for oblivion. Another practice, seeking and 
obtaining confessions from young children during custodial 
questioning, has been reformed in Illinois and California 
with the enactment of  statutes mandating that children 
under the age of  15 obtain the advice of  legal counsel before 
executing a confession during custodial interrogations. 
(Ill. Pub. Act No. 099-0882 (2016).) The Illinois and 
California laws may be the first measures precluding or at 
least limiting the admissibility of  confessions by the very 
young, an age group in which confessions or admissions 
have proven extraordinarily unreliable.
Last, the past few years has seen the proliferation of 
diversionary and restorative justice programs. (See, e.g., H. 
Ted Rubin, Moving the Money: Using Institutional Savings 
to Expand Investment in Local Interventions, 23 Juv. Just. 
uPDate, no. 2, 2017.) The policy of diverting and treating the 
nonviolent child (and in some cases the violent child) in lieu 
of judicial adjudication is beneficial to both the youngster and 
society. It is also far more cost-effective than the alternative 
prosecution model.
OTHER NEEDED REFORMS
The progress toward a child-friendly juvenile justice 
paradigm has been impressive, but at least a few 
counterproductive policies remain largely untouched. 
The Adam Walsh Act, which requires children who 
have committed nonviolent sexual offenses to register as 
sex offenders, often for life, has yet to be ameliorated. 
(Nicole I. Pitman & Riya Saha Shah, Cruel and Unusual: 
The Case against Registering Kids as Sex Offenders, 32 
cRim. Just., no. 2, Summer 2017, at 32.) In several states, 
the prosecution of  the very young accused of  criminal 
conduct remains unabated. Last, the level of  representation 
afforded juveniles is inconsistent nationally, ranging from 
meaningless to excellent.
CONCLUSION
The state of American juvenile justice has improved significantly 
in the past several years. However, the reforms are best viewed 
as a work in progress. Much has been accomplished, but much 
remains to be accomplished. Crucially, after a generation of 
“tough on kids” measures, we are on the road toward a true 
“justice” system for children.n
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
